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Abstract
Firms generating larger surpluses on average pay higher wages. We study
the effect of this rent-sharing between firms and workers on international tax
competition. In our model, firms in a large country can shift surplus to a tax
haven. In the benchmark case firms only have a tax incentive for profit shifting
as shifted surplus is fully taken into account in the wage bargaining. In this
case rent-sharing decreases the competitive pressure on the large country and
leads to higher equilibrium tax rates. When workers do not observe the full
surplus shifted, a wage incentive arises. Profit shifting then becomes more
attractive as it reduces the surplus bargained over with workers. If this effect
is sufficiently strong, rent-sharing increases the competitive pressure on the
large country, which implies a lower equilibrium tax rate.
JEL: F23, H25, H73
Keywords: wages, tax competition, rent-sharing, profit shifting, tax havens
∗ We would like to thank Mike Devereux, Daniel Dreßler, Ben Ferrett, Clemens Fuest, Giorgia Maffini,
Andreas Haufler, Eckard Janeba, Marko Koethenbuerger, Udo Kreickemeier, Frank Sta¨hler as well as
seminar participants of the CBT Summer Symposium 2011, Loughborough University, University of
Tu¨bingen and ZEW Mannheim for fruitful discussions and comments. Any remaining errors are our own.
Schmidt-Eisenlohr acknowledges financial support from the ESRC (Grant No RES -060-25-0033).
† Goethe University Frankfurt
‡ Centre for Business Taxation, University of Oxford and CESifo, Munich
1 Introduction
Rent-sharing between firm owners and workers is a robust finding in a large number of
empirical studies. That is, more profitable firms pay higher wages to their employees than
comparable firms with lower profits. Moreover, when management and workers bargain
over observable rents, the management of a firm can limit the amount of rents going to
workers by under-reporting profits and withholding relevant information on profitability.
Several studies provide evidence for this mechanism: in the presence of wage bargaining,
management tends to under-report profits and create informational opacity.1
While most firms can adjust reported income and limit information to some extent,
multinational firms have ample opportunities to do so.2 They have an extensive abil-
ity to shift surplus between jurisdictions, for example by setting transfer prices, royalty
payments and intra-group interest rates.3 To limit wage costs, the management of a
multinational may therefore shift surplus away from affiliates with large and strong work
forces and limit information on affiliate profitability available to workers.
A different and well-documented incentive for profit shifting are tax differences across
locations: many multinational firms shift profits to low tax jurisdictions, in many cases
tax havens, in order to reduce their tax burden. This is the standard focus in the tax
competition literature.
In this paper, we introduce rent-sharing between firms and workers into a standard
model of international tax competition. While the mechanisms studied should be rel-
evant for tax competition both between similar and dissimilar countries, for analytical
tractability, we focus on a tax game between a large country and a tax haven.
We find that in the benchmark case, where firms only have a tax incentive for profit
shifting, rent-sharing weakens tax competition. It reduces the share of surplus going
to firms and, as the gains from shifting are proportional to profits, makes shifting less
1We discuss this literature below.
2A case in point is “stateless income”. Kleinbard (2011) argues that a share of the surplus of most
multinational firms falls into this category. These are rents that are not directly linked to real activities
in any specific location and that can be easily moved across jurisdictions.
3The structures of multinationals are complex and their financial accounts are harder to disentangle
than those of domestic firms. This increases informational asymmetry between management and workers.
Desai and Dharmapala (2011) argue that attributing profits to different factors of production and different
locations is difficult even for the management of multinational firms.
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attractive for firms. If multinationals can use profit shifting also to reduce wages, the
effect of rent-sharing can be overturned. That is, when the wage effect is sufficiently
strong, rent-sharing strengthens tax competition.
In our model, firms operate under monopolistic competition and generate positive
surpluses. All production takes place in the large country but firms can choose to shift
their surplus to an affiliate in the tax haven where profits are taxed at a different tax rate.
Firms differ in the fixed costs of shifting surplus, which are distributed uniformly across
firms.
We model the wage setting at the firm level as a Nash bargaining game between
workers and firm owners. This leads to rent-sharing and therefore to a positive link
between surplus and wages. For a firm declaring its surplus in the large country, the full
surplus is bargained over. When the surplus is shifted to the tax haven, only a fraction
η of the surplus is taken into account in the wage bargaining. We refer to this fraction η
as the detection ability of workers.
The model delivers analytical solutions for the equilibrium tax rates of the large coun-
try and the tax haven, respectively. We adopt a flexible setting where the detection
ability can take any value between zero and one allowing for anything from no detection
to perfect detection of shifted surplus. This allows us to analyze the benchmark case
of full detection separately from cases, where shifting allows firms to reduce the surplus
bargained over.
We analyze how the introduction of rent-sharing affects tax competition. We first
consider the case where workers can fully detect shifted surplus so that there is only a tax
incentive for profit shifting (tax channel). In this case, the sole effect of rent-sharing is an
increase in the share of surplus going to workers. Given the fixed cost, shifting becomes
less attractive for firms. This reduces the competitive pressure on the government of the
large country. It faces a less mobile tax base and can set a higher equilibrium tax rate.
We then analyze the case where workers can imperfectly detect shifted profits. As only
detected profits are taken into account in the wage bargaining, an additional incentive for
profit shifting arises (wage channel). When the wage channel is active, the effect of rent-
sharing on tax competition becomes ambiguous. If the additional incentive for shifting
surplus is weak, rent-sharing continues to decrease the strength of tax competition. If
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the additional incentive is sufficiently strong, the effect is overturned and rent-sharing
increases the strength of tax competition. In this case, the large country is forced to set
a lower tax rate to limit outflows of surplus.
To complement our analysis of the tax setting of a benevolent government, we study the
own-tax elasticities of tax revenues of the large country and the tax haven, respectively.
These elasticities measure how much tax revenues of a country change if that country
changes its own tax rate. While these own-tax elasticities fully determine optimal tax rates
under revenue maximization, in our setup they only do so partially. These elasticities can
be decomposed into a direct effect and a tax base effect. The latter is key in our model.
It is the component of the revenue elasticity that captures in- and outflows of tax base,
i.e. the change in the number of shifting firms implied by the change in the tax rate. We
study how the tax base effect depends on the bargaining power of workers and the ability
of workers to detect shifted profits. We find that the tax base effect of both countries
decreases in the bargaining power of workers, i.e. more rent-sharing reduces the own-tax
elasticities, reducing the strength of tax competition. This is different for the detection
ability: it increases the tax base effect of the large country, while it decreases the tax
base effect of the tax haven. If workers have a weaker detection ability, the tax game is
therefore changed in favor of the tax haven. This effect is the stronger, the larger the
bargaining power of workers.
This paper contributes to the literature on international tax competition started by
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986).4 One important strand of this lit-
erature analyzes how multinational firms shift profits across borders responding to tax
incentives. Several empirical studies have shown that multinationals indeed use profit
shifting to reduce their tax payments.5 Theoretical work in this area has mainly focused
on the question how profit shifting can allow a multinational firm to reduce its tax pay-
ments and in how far this limits the ability of governments to raise taxes.6 We extend the
analysis of profit shifting by introducing wage bargaining into the standard tax competi-
4See Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004) or Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2005) for surveys.
5See among others Swenson (2001), Altshuler and Grubert (2003), Clausing (2003), Desai, Foley, and
Hines (2004), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008) and Maffini
and Mokkas (2011).
6See e.g. Elitzur and Mintz (1996), Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), Janeba (2000), Mintz and Smart
(2004), Peralta, Wauthy, and van Ypersele (2006) and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2008).
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tion game. Solving for the equilibrium of the extended tax game allows us to evaluate the
effect of rent-sharing on tax competition and to study a new incentive for profit shifting:
the wage channel.
The most related paper is Riedel (2011). She outlines a model of tax competition with
wage bargaining within a multinational firm, but does not derive the equilibrium of the
tax game. Instead, she focuses on the case of identical tax rates and analyzes the different
implications of separate accounting and formula apportionment.
Our paper also contributes to the recent literature of tax competition with hetero-
geneous firms. Several papers have introduced firm heterogeneity into models of tax
competition. In Burbidge, Cuff, and Leach (2006) firms differ in market specific produc-
tivity. Baldwin and Okubo (2009), Davies and Eckel (2010), Haufler and Sta¨hler (2010)
and Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) model a heterogeneous variable production
cost. We follow Mongrain and Wilson (2011) by studying the case of a constant variable
production cost combined with heterogeneous shifting costs.
There is ample empirical evidence of a positive relationship between wages and profits.7
Several theoretical approaches can generate this link. We follow Blanchflower, Oswald,
and Sanfey (1996) who propose a model where workers and firm owners bargain over the
generated surplus.8
More recently, Budd and Slaughter (2004), Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005)
and Martins and Yang (2010) provide evidence that within multinational firms rent-
sharing also takes place across national borders. Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005)
and Martins and Yang (2010) show that higher profits in the headquarter are shared with
workers in the foreign affiliates. It is of interest to note, however, that both papers do not
find robust evidence for rent-sharing in the opposite direction: higher affiliate profits have
no significant effect on wages in the headquarters. This asymmetry is consistent with our
model: to the extent to which shifted surpluses are not detected by workers, they should
7See for example Katz, Summers, Hall, Schultze, and Topel (1989), Christofides and Oswald (1992),
Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996), Van Reenen (1996) and Hildreth
and Oswald (1997) and references therein.
8An alternative way to generate this link is the ‘fair wage’ hypothesis introduced by Akerlof and Yellen
(1990), according to which workers only provide full effort if they receive a wage they consider ‘fair’. The
fair wage can depend on factors like wages in other firms, firm profits or the productivity of the firm.
Lindbeck and Snower (1988) propose an insider-outsider model of the labor market also generating a link
between profits and wages.
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not affect domestic wages.
The extent to which the management of a firm manipulates reported income to affect
wage bargaining is the focus of a literature in accounting and finance. It analyzes whether
managers reduce information provision and under-report income to limit rents that can
be appropriated by workers and whether information sharing affects wages. Using stock
market and firm level data, Hilary (2006) finds that stronger labor representation is re-
lated to more information asymmetry between management and investors. DeAngelo
and DeAngelo (1991) study labor negotiations in the steel industry in the 1980s. They
find that reported income and management compensation is lower in years when there
are labor negotiations than in years when there are none. In particular one-time spe-
cial charges that can be allocated discretionary by management across years are used
to reduce reported income in negotiation years. Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) find that
wages and benefits increase with information-sharing between management and workers,
whereas productivity is unaffected.
Our paper is also related to the literature on tax havens. The quantitative importance
of tax havens has been documented by Hines and Rice (1994), Hines (2005) and Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2006). Two recent theoretical contributions, Slemrod and Wilson (2009)
and Hong and Smart (2010), discuss the desirability of tax havens. Marceau, Mongrain,
and Wilson (2010) show that, in a non-preferential regime, the effect of a tax haven on
equilibrium tax rates of larger countries might be limited.
A recent literature studies the tax incidence of the corporate income tax. Taking tax
policy as given, this literature focuses on the question to which extent firms share the
burden of taxation with workers. Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini (2010) analyze
a model where workers wage bargain with the firm over post-tax surplus, which implies
that part of the tax burden falls on labor. In support of this prediction, the authors
find evidence for a negative correlation between the tax bill and the wage bill of a firm
after controlling for value added. Felix and Hines (2009) report similar results on the
relationship between tax payments and wages in unionized firms in the US. In our paper,
we abstract from this direct tax incidence. Instead, we analyze how wage bargaining
affects the profit shifting behavior of firms and thereby the strategic tax game between
governments.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the model
and analyzes the determinants of the cutoff cost level. Section 3 introduces the tax game
between the large country and the tax haven and presents the best response functions.
The equilibrium of the tax game as well as the main results of the paper are derived in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economy
Large country: All production takes place in the large country. Labor is the only input
in production. There is a unit mass of workers who each inelastically supply one unit
of labor. There are two sectors, one producing varieties of a differentiated good and one
producing a homogeneous good used as the numeraire. One unit of the homogeneous good
is produced using one unit of labor. This implies that the wage in the homogeneous good
sector is one. We only consider equilibria in which the homogeneous good is produced.
Wages in the differentiated good sector may be above one, but the sector is too small
to accommodate all workers. There is a fixed and exogenous measure of firms in the
differentiated good sector of size one, which are owned by consumers in the large country.
The only tax instrument of the government in the large country is a proportional tax
tH on the profits of firms in the large country. Tax income is used to provide government
services G to consumers. The government can transform one unit of the numeraire good
into one unit of the government services. It is assumed to maximize welfare of its own
citizens.
Tax haven: The structure of the tax haven is kept as simple as possible. It does not
have a tax base of its own. Its only source of revenue stems from taxing profits of affiliates
located in the tax haven with a tax rate of tX . Taking the tax rate in the large country
as given, the tax haven maximizes total revenues V = tXΠX .
Preferences: The workers in the large country are all identical and share the same
quasi-linear preferences over the two consumption goods and the good provided by the
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government:
U = α lnQ+ β G+ q0 with Q =
(∫
I
q
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
, (1)
where qi is the quantity consumed of variety i and I is the set of available varieties.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties is given by σ > 1. Q represents utility
from consumption of a basket of differentiated goods. G is the quantity of a public good
provided by the government. The consumption of the numeraire good is given by q0. α
and β are parameters with 0 < α < 1 < β. The parameter β represents marginal utility
from the public good. Setting β > 1 assures that the government has an incentive to
provide the public good also when the distortion from tax competition is introduced.
Demand for one particular variety is:
qi =
p−σi
P−σ
Q. (2)
pi is the price of variety i, and P is the welfare based price index.
9
2.2 Surplus Shifting and Wages
Worker compensation: Firms in the differentiated goods sector generate a positive
surplus that is shared between workers and firm owners. The fraction of surplus going to
each group is determined in a Nash bargaining game.
The Nash product of the bargaining problem in firm i is:
[wi − 1]δ[(1− tH)pii − 0]1−δ. (3)
The parameter δ represents the bargaining power of workers. Wage payments in firm i
are denoted by wi, the outside option of workers is employment in the homogeneous good
sector with a wage of one. After tax profits of the firm are (1 − tH)pii and the outside
option of the firm is no production with zero profits. We define si as the overall surplus
(at wages of unity) generated by firm i. We denote the fraction of this surplus payed
9The welfare based price index is defined as P =
(∫
I
p1−σi di
) 1
1−σ .
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to workers by xi, so that overall wage payments are (1 + xisi) and profits are given by
(1− xi)si. We can thus rewrite equation (3):
[xisi]
δ[(1− tH)(1− xi)si](1−δ). (4)
Maximizing the Nash product implies that the worker’s fraction of surplus equals their
bargaining power: xi = δ ∀i. This implies a simple sharing rule where surplus-dependent
payments to workers are bH = δsi and pre-tax profits are piH = (1− δ)si.
Prices and surplus: In a model without rent-sharing between the firm and workers
(δ = 0), firms charge a constant mark up over marginal cost. In the model with rent-
sharing (δ > 0) we find that the optimal pricing rule of firms is unchanged:
pi =
σ
σ − 1 a. (5)
The firm gives a fraction of its surplus to workers. It then pays a share of the remaining
surplus (its pre-tax profits) as taxes to the government. The price maximizing total
surplus is the same as the price maximizing post-tax profits. Since all firms share the
same productivity, all firms charge the same price pi = p, ∀i. The surplus of a firm is
given by:
si = qp− aq = α
σ
. (6)
It follows that surplus-dependent payments to workers are bH = δ
α
σ
and pre-tax profits
are piH = (1− δ)ασ .
Surplus shifting: Firms in the large country have the ability to open an affiliate in
the tax haven, which allows them to shift surplus abroad. There are two ways in which
a firm can benefit from surplus shifting. Shifted surplus is taxed in the tax haven at the
rate tX , but not at home, where the firm declares zero profits.
In addition, only a fraction η ∈ [0, 1] of its shifted surplus is detected by workers and
therefore taken into account in the wage bargaining. When firms shift the surplus abroad,
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(1 − η)si of it is not detected by the workers, so that bargaining is over ηsi only. The
Nash product in the shifting case becomes:
[xiηsi]
δ[(1− tH)(1− xi)ηsi](1−δ). (7)
For the benchmark case of perfect detection (η = 1), this is identical to equation (4). If
workers cannot detect all shifted surplus (η < 1), workers and the firm bargain only over
a fraction of the actual surplus. Varying η ∈ [0, 1] allows us to consider the whole range
of cases between no detection and perfect detection of shifted surplus.
Opening an affiliate in the tax haven requires paying a fixed cost ci. These fixed
costs are distributed uniformly between zero and one, i.e. F (c) = c with c ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that this cost is borne completely by the owners of the firm, and that it is
neither tax deductible in the tax haven, nor does it affect the surplus bargained over with
workers. The welfare maximizing government does, nevertheless, take into account the
loss of resources due to the fixed cost of surplus shifting.
Of the surplus generated by a shifting firm, surplus-dependent payments to workers are
bX = ηδ
α
σ
and after-tax payments to shareholders are (1− tX)piX(a) = (1− tX)(1− ηδ)ασ .
The remainder represents tax payments to the government in the tax haven.
Self selection into surplus shifting: The cutoff shifting cost level c∗ is defined as the
shifting cost of a firm which is indifferent between shifting surplus and paying taxes at
home. This cost level is pinned down by (1 − tH) piH = (1 − tX) piX(c∗) which can be
solved for:
c∗ =
α
σ
ρ˜, (8)
with:
ρ˜ = (1− tX)(1− ηδ)− (1− tH)(1− δ) (9)
= ρ− ηδ(1− tX) + δ(1− tH),
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and ρ = tH − tX . We label ρ˜ ‘effective tax difference’. It reflects the different incentives
for surplus shifting. When the wage channel is open, the difference in tax rates is no
longer the only determinant of surplus shifting. Firms have to share surplus with workers
(reflected by the parameter δ) and shifting allows them to reduce the fraction going to
workers to ηδ.
Note that sharing surplus with workers works exactly like a 100% tax rate on a fraction
δ of surplus when surplus is not shifted and on a fraction ηδ when surplus is shifted. So
the ‘effective tax rate’ a non-shifting firm is facing is a combination of tH payed on (1− δ)
of surplus and a 100% tax rate on a share δ. When surplus is shifted, only a fraction ηδ
is ‘taxed away’ by workers.10
Shifting incentives with rent-sharing and imperfect detection The bargaining
power δ and the detection ability η of workers affect the incentives for firms to shift
surplus. This can be seen by considering the change in the cutoff shifting cost level c∗
that is associated with changes in these two parameters, respectively. First, consider an
increase in the bargaining power δ:
Lemma 1 Suppose c∗ ∈ (0, 1). Then, for given tax rates tH and tX , an increase in the
bargaining power of workers δ,
– decreases the number of firms shifting surplus (lower c∗) iff the detection ability η is
greater than 1−tH
1−tX .
– increases the number of firms shifting surplus (higher c∗) iff the detection ability η
is less than 1−tH
1−tX .
– does not affect the number of firms shifting surplus (constant c∗) otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix A.
If workers have a strong or perfect ability to detect surplus (high η), the main incentive
to shift surplus is to reduce tax payments (tax channel). In this case, an increase in
δ reduces shifting incentives for firms. It implies lower pre-tax profits and therefore
10The ‘effective tax rates’ for the firms can be defined as t˜H = (1− δ)tH + δ and t˜X = (1− ηδ)tX + ηδ.
Their difference gives equation (9).
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diminishes the gain from surplus shifting, which are proportional to the pre-tax profits.
If workers can only detect a small fraction of the shifted surplus (low η), surplus shifting
is attractive due to wage bill considerations. Then, an increase in δ increases the wage
difference between shifting and non-shifting firms and thereby increases the incentive to
shift surplus.
Second, consider an increase in the detection ability of workers (higher η):
Lemma 2 Suppose c∗ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1). Then, for given tax rates tH and tX ,
(i) an increase in the detection ability of workers (η), decreases the number of firms
shifting surplus (lower c∗).
(ii) the effect of the detection ability on the shifting behavior is the stronger, the stronger
the bargaining power of workers δ.
Proof: see Appendix A.
If workers are less able to detect surplus (lower η), firms gain more from shifting
surplus, as they can save more on their wage bill. This effect is the stronger, the larger
the bargaining power of workers δ. In this case the ability to reduce the surplus bargained
over becomes more beneficial for the firm owners.
Aggregation Aggregate surpluses generated by non-shifters and shifters SH and SX
are split into aggregate surplus dependent payments BH and BX and taxable profits ΠH
and ΠX :
11
SH =
∫ 1
c∗
α
σ
dF (c) = (1− c∗)α
σ
SX = c
∗α
σ
(10)
BH = (1− c∗)δα
σ
BX = c
∗ηδ
α
σ
(11)
11As firms are fully characterized by their cost levels, we can take the integral over the support of F (c)
in the aggregation.
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ΠH = (1− c∗)(1− δ)α
σ
ΠX = c
∗(1− ηδ)α
σ
. (12)
Total shifting costs are given by:
C =
∫ c∗
0
cdF (c) =
1
2
(c∗)2 . (13)
3 Tax Competition
The only variables governments can set are the profit tax rates in their jurisdictions.
Taxes are set in a simultaneous one-shot game.
3.1 Optimization of the Tax Haven
Taking the tax rate in the large country as given, the tax haven maximizes total revenues
V = tXΠX , which implies the following best response function of the tax haven:
tX(tH) =
ρ˜
1− ηδ (14)
=
δ(1− η)
2(1− ηδ) +
1− δ
2(1− ηδ)tH .
Figure 1 illustrates numerical examples of this best response function. The tax rate of
the tax haven is plotted on the horizontal line against the tax rate of the large country.
The dotted lines are the best response functions of the tax haven for different values of δ
(for a constant η = 0.3). The best response function to the left represents the case of no
rent-sharing δ = 0. In this case the intercept in equation (14) becomes zero, implying that
the best response is always above the 45 degree line, i.e. the tax haven always undercuts
the large country. This is a familiar result from the tax competition literature.
For values of δ larger zero, the wage channel is active. In these cases, the tax haven
undercuts the large country for high tax rates in the large country. For low values of tH ,
however, the tax haves optimally responds by setting a higher tax rate. The range of
large country tax rates for which this is the case increases as δ increases.
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Figure 1: Best response function of tax haven for different δ. Horizontal axis: tax haven tax
rate tX , vertical axis: large country tax rate tH . η = 0.3, σ = 4, α = 0.7, β = 1.1.
3.2 Optimization of the Large Country
The government in the large country maximizes welfare of its citizens which is:
U = U¯ + (1− tH)ΠH + (1− tX)ΠX +BH +BX + βtHΠH − C. (15)
The first term on the right hand side is a constant given by:
U¯ = α ln
(α
σ
)
− α + 1.
U¯ consists of the utility from consuming the basket of differentiated goods, the cost of
this basket α and basic labor income 1. The second and third terms in equation (15)
are the profits retained by consumers of non-shifting and shifting firms, respectively. The
next two terms represent surplus dependent payments to workers. The final two terms
are the overall utility from the consumption of the public good and the aggregate costs
of surplus shifting.
For the derivation of the best response of the large country two cases need to be
distinguished. The large country can set a tax rate that implies an effective tax rate
above the tax rate of the tax haven. In this case, some firms shift surplus to the tax
haven. Alternatively, the large country can set a tax rate that is sufficiently low to assure
zero outflows of tax base. For the construction of the best response function, we consider
both cases. For each possible value of tX the best response is represented by the alternative
13
that implies higher welfare.
Additionally, it has to be taken into account that the tax rate of the large country is
bounded from above by one and from below by zero. In the following we focus on interior
solutions, where the large country never sets a zero tax rate and where the best response
of the large country implies ρ˜ = 0 for some tX ≤ 1.12 The best response function of the
large country is then given by:
tH(tX) =

(β − 1)σ/α− βδ(1− η)
(1− δ)(2β − 1) +
β − 1
2β − 1
1− ηδ
1− δ tX if 0 ≤ tX < t
k1
X
(16)
−δ(1− η)
1− δ +
1− ηδ
1− δ tX if t
k1
X ≤ tX ≤ 1,
with tk1X =
(β−1)[σ/α−δ(1−η)]
β(1−ηδ) and t
k2
X =
βδ(1−η)−(β−1)σ/α
(β−1)(1−ηδ) . For low values of tX , the large
country sets a tax rate tH such that ρ˜ > 0, inducing a positive mass of firms to shift
surplus. For higher values of tX , the large country prevents all outflows by choosing a tax
rate tH which sets the effective tax difference to zero (ρ˜ = 0).
The best response function is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. The function to the left
Figure 2: Best response function of large country for different δ. Horizontal axis: tax haven
tax rate tX , vertical axis: large country tax rate tH . η = 0.3, σ = 4, α = 0.7, β = 1.1.
represents the benchmark case of δ = 0, where the wage channel is closed down. In this
case, tax differences are the only incentives for firms to shift surplus. For low values of
tX , the large country sets a higher tax rate than the tax haven. For high values of tX , it
12For detailed derivations and the full characterization of the best response function of the large country,
including all corner solutions, see Appendix C.
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is optimal for the large country to set its tax rate equal to the tax rate of the tax haven,
which in the absence of the wage channel assures zero outflows of tax base. This implies
that when the wage channel is not active, the large country always sets a tax rate larger
or equal to the tax rate of the tax haven.
When δ is positive (given η = 0.3), firms have an additional incentive for shifting surplus
to the tax haven: reducing their wage bill. With the wage channel open, it can be optimal
for the large country to undercut the tax haven. This is reflected by the points below
the 45-degree line. A strong wage channel (combination of high δ and low η) can make
surplus shifting so attractive for wage reasons that the tax haven can set a higher tax rate
than the large country and still attract some of the tax base.
4 Tax Equilibrium and the Wage Channel
4.1 Equilibrium
Based on the best response functions of the tax haven and the large country in equations
(14) and (16), we can derive the equilibrium tax rates:
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium of the tax game. Equilibrium tax rates are
given by:
t∗H = min
{
max
{
2(β − 1)σ/α− (β + 1)δ(1− η)
(3β − 1)(1− δ) , 0
}
, 1
}
(17)
t∗X = min
{
(β − 1)[σ/α + δ(1− η)]
(3β − 1)(1− ηδ) ,
1
2
}
. (18)
Proof: see Appendix D.
The graphs in Figure 3 illustrate equilibria for full, partial and no detection ability
of workers. For the benchmark case of perfect detection (η = 1) we get a standard
equilibrium with the tax haven undercutting the large country in the first graph. The
second and third graphs illustrate the cases where the wage channel is open and workers
can only detect a fraction η = 0.5 and η = 0 of shifted surplus. Opening up the wage
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channel pushes the equilibrium tax rates down. In the second graph (η = 0.5), we
still obtain the standard result that the tax haven undercuts the large country but the
equilibrium is closer to the 45 degree line, implying that tax rates are more similar.13
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Equilibria of the tax game for different degrees of detection (a): η = 1; (b): η = 0.5
and (c): η = 0. Horizontal axis: tax haven tax rate tX (dashed line), vertical axis: large country
tax rate tH (thick solid line). Thin line: 45 degree line. Other parameters: δ = 0.4, σ = 4,
α = 0.7, β = 1.1.
In the special case of no detection (η = 0), the wage channel is so strong that the tax
haven even sets a higher tax rate than the large country. That is, for extreme parameter
values the standard result of the tax haven undercutting the large country can be reversed.
In our model, the wage channel creates an additional incentive for surplus shifting
and therefore weakens the standard link between tax rate differentials and the direction
of surplus shifting. In the next section we investigate the impact of the wage channel
on the tax equilibrium and show under which conditions its introduction increases the
competitive pressure on the large country.
4.2 Wage Channel and Competitive Pressure
We now analyze the effect of the wage channel on the tax equilibrium. For this analysis,
it is key to differentiate between the role of the bargaining power of workers δ and their
ability to detect shifted surplus η.
Rent-Sharing: We first analyze the impact of the introduction of rent-sharing on the
tax equilibrium as well as on the strength of the competitive pressure the large country
13The effects of changes in the detection ability on the equilibrium are discussed in detail in section
4.2.
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faces. In a world without a tax haven (autarky), the optimal tax rate of the large country
is equal to one. We use the deviation of the equilibrium tax rate from this welfare
maximizing autarky tax rate 1 − t∗H as a measure competitive pressure. For notational
convenience, we define κ ≡ 1− 2β−1
β+1
σ
α
. We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 At an interior equilibrium, i.e. t∗H ∈ (0, 1), when the bargaining power of
workers δ increases,
(i) the equilibrium tax rate of the large country t∗H
– increases (competitive pressure decreases) iff the detection ability η is greater
than κ.
– decreases (competitive pressure increases) iff the detection ability η is less than
κ.
– is constant (competitive pressure constant) otherwise.
(ii) the equilibrium tax rate of the tax haven t∗X increases.
Proof: see Appendix E.
The impact of the worker’s bargaining power δ on the equilibrium tax rates and the
strength of competitive pressure depends on the detection ability η. When it is sufficiently
strong, surplus shifting does not have a strong impact on the wage bill. In this case, the
main incentive for surplus shifting is the tax channel. When δ increases firm owners get
a smaller fraction of the surplus. This implies that the tax savings from shifting decrease
and are therefore less likely to outweigh the fixed cost of shifting. This reduced incentive
to shift surplus reduces the competitive pressure the large country faces.
The bargaining power of workers δ has the opposite effect when detection ability η is
sufficiently weak. In this case, surplus shifting becomes more attractive the higher δ: it
allows firms to partially neutralize the strong bargaining power of workers by shifting
surplus to the tax haven, where only a small fraction of them is detected. As δ increases,
the increased competitive pressure forces the government of the large country to set a
lower tax rate.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Equilibrium tax rates of the large country (solid line) and the tax haven (dashed line)
as a function of the degree of rent-sharing δ (horizontal axis). Graph (a): η = 1, graph (b):
η = 0. Other parameters: σ = 4, α = 0.7, β = 1.1.
The effects in Proposition 2 are illustrated in Figure 4 where the equilibrium tax rates
of the large country (solid line) and of the tax haven (dashed line) are plotted against
δ. We consider the two extreme cases of η = 1 (perfect detection) in the first graph and
η = 0 (no detection) in the second graph.
With perfect detection, an increase in δ weakens the tax channel, decreases competitive
pressure and therefore allows the large country to set a higher tax rate. When detection is
imperfect (η < 1), the competitive pressure increases and the schedule of equilibrium tax
rates of the large country becomes flatter. It is constant when the condition in Proposition
2 holds with equality. For lower values of η the slope is negative. The second graph in
Figure 4 illustrates the case of no detection (η = 0).
Effect of Detection Ability: We now consider the effect of different degrees of detec-
tion ability on the tax competition equilibrium as well as the strength of the competitive
pressure the large country faces. These effects are summarized in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3 At an interior equilibrium with rent-sharing, i.e. t∗H ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈
(0, 1),
(i) when the detection ability η is weaker, the equilibrium tax rate of the large country
t∗H is lower. Therefore, the degree of tax competition (measured by 1− t∗H) is higher.
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(ii) the effect of the detection ability η on the equilibrium tax rate t∗H is the stronger, the
higher the bargaining power δ.
(iii) when the detection ability η is weaker, the equilibrium tax rate of the tax haven t∗X
is lower.
Proof: see Appendix F.
When the detection ability decreases, the wage incentive for surplus shifting gets
stronger. Ceteris paribus, more firms start shifting surplus. This implies that it becomes
more difficult for the large country to prevent its tax base from flowing to the tax haven.
This increased competitive pressure forces the large country to set a lower tax rate, opti-
mally trading off the effects of the lower tax rate both on outflows and on tax payments
by firms that keep paying taxes at home.14
The effect of the detection ability η on the equilibrium tax rate t∗H increases in the
bargaining power of workers δ. The intuition is that the more surplus a firm would have
to give to workers at home, the more important becomes the wage bill motive for surplus
shifting. The equilibrium tax rate of the tax haven also decreases when detection ability
decreases.
Figure 5: Equilibrium tax rates of the large country (solid line) and the tax haven (dashed line)
as a function of the detection parameter η (horizontal axis). Other parameters: δ = 0.5, σ = 4,
α = 0.7, β = 1.1.
14Section 4.3 provides a detailed analysis of the determinants of the own-tax elasticity of the tax
revenues in the large country.
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Figure 5 illustrates the results in Proposition 3. Both the tax rate of the large country
(solid line) and the tax rate of the tax haven are increasing in η. So when workers can
detect a smaller fraction of shifted surplus (lower η), surplus shifting is more attractive
and the equilibrium tax rates are lower. The fact that the model delivers a negative tax
difference (i.e. tX > tH) for some parameter values is also reflected in Figure 5: for weak
detection abilities the tax rate of the tax haven is above the tax rate of the large country.
4.3 Tax Revenue Elasticities and the Wage Channel
In this section we study the own-tax elasticities of tax revenues of the large country and
the tax haven. While these elasticities are key when revenue maximization is the sole gov-
ernment objective, they only partially determine tax rates set by a welfare maximizing
government. In taking a closer look at the revenue aspect of the problem of the gov-
ernment, this section therefore complements our analysis of the tax setting problem of a
benevolent government from before.
In our model, the tax revenue elasticities of the large country and the tax haven can
be decomposed into a direct effect (DE) and a tax base effect (BE). Holding the tax base
constant, an increase in the tax rate increases tax revenue (direct effect). At the same
time an increase in the tax rate leads to a reduction in the tax base (tax base effect).
Using Leibnitz rule, the own-tax elasticities of tax revenues for the large country and
the tax haven, respectively, can be decomposed into the two effects:
d(ΠHtH)
dtH
1
ΠH
=
1
ΠH
∫ 1
c∗
∂
∂tH
tHpiH(a)
dF (c)
dc
dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect (DEH)
− 1
ΠH
tHpiH(c
∗)
dF (c∗)
dc
dc∗
dtH︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax base effect (BEH)
(19)
= 1− 1− δσ
α
− ρ˜ tH . (20)
d(ΠXtX)
dtX
1
ΠX
=
1
ΠX
∫ c∗
0
∂
∂tX
tXpiX(c)
dF (c)
dc
dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect (DEX)
+
1
ΠX
tXpiX(c
∗)
dF (c∗)
dc
dc∗
dtX︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax base effect (BEX)
(21)
= 1− 1− ηδ
ρ˜
tX . (22)
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The direct effect holds the tax base constant (constant c∗) and captures the variation
in taxes payed by each individual firm. Both for the large country and the tax haven, the
direct effect is positive and equal to unity. That is, holding the tax base constant, a one
percent increase in the tax rate increases revenues by one percent.
To compute the tax base effect, tax payments of a firm at the cutoff are multiplied
with the change in the number of shifting firms implied by the change in the tax rate. As
long as some firms are paying taxes in each country (0 < c∗ < 1), this effect always implies
a loss of tax base for the country that raises its tax rate. To facilitate the interpretation,
in the following we define as the strength of the tax base effect its absolute value. That
is: |BEH | = | − 1−δσ
α
−ρ˜ tH | and |BEX | = |1−ηδρ˜ |.
The wage channel affects the own-tax elasticities of both countries through the tax
base effect. The effect of rent-sharing on the strength of the tax base effect is summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 An increase in the bargaining power of workers δ reduces the strength of
the tax base effect for both countries, i.e. ∂|BEH |
∂δ
< 0 and ∂|BEX |
∂δ
< 0.
Proof: see Appendix G.
If a larger share of the surplus is given to the workers, multinational firms have lower
pre-tax profits, implying a weaker incentive to shift surplus. Therefore, an increase in
rent-sharing (higher δ) reduces the strength of the tax base effect for both countries.
The detection ability η also affects the strength of the tax base effect, as summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If the detection ability η increases, the strength of the tax base effect of
the
(i) large country decreases, i.e. ∂|BEH |
∂η
< 0
(ii) tax haven increases, i.e. ∂|BEX |
∂η
> 0.
Proof: see Appendix G.
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An imperfect detection ability of workers alters the tax competition game in favor of
the tax haven, as it gives firms an additional incentive to shift surplus. As a consequence, a
weaker detection ability (lower η) has opposing effects for the two countries. For the large
country the strength of tax base effect increases which implies that the large country faces
a higher own-tax elasticity. For the tax haven we have the opposite case: the strength of
its tax base effect decreases implying a lower own-tax elasticity. Thus, a weaker detection
ability increases the competitive pressure on the large country.
5 Conclusions
Rent-sharing between workers and firms is a well documented and quantitatively impor-
tant phenomenon. In this paper we introduce this aspect into a model of international
tax competition and analyze its impact on the tax equilibrium. When there is only a
tax incentive for surplus shifting, the introduction of rent-sharing reduces the competi-
tive pressure on the large country. As rent-sharing reduces profits, the incentive to shift
surplus decreases given the fixed cost of shifting. When workers can imperfectly observe
shifted surplus, an additional incentive for surplus shifting arises. If the wage channel is
sufficiently strong, rent-sharing can increase the degree of tax competition and can force
the large country to set a lower tax rate.
While our analysis focuses on tax competition between a large country and a tax
haven, the mechanisms identified should be generalizable to a wider set of models. Multi-
national companies producing in different locations, for example, have many opportunities
to affect wages by shifting profits. This is particularly relevant as the strength of labor
representation typically differs across production locations.
The analysis in this paper shows how in the presence of some indeterminacy in the
allocation of profits within a multinational firm, one stakeholder can allocate profits to
its advantage and at the expense of other stakeholders. Here, we focus on the bargaining
between firm owners and workers. The mechanism should in principle extend to a wider
set of conflicts of interest within multinationals. This could include conflicts between
equity holders and lenders or majority and minority shareholders. To which extent these
cases give rise to similar effects is an interesting question for future research.
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A Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2: Shifting incentives
Lemma 1 Taking the derivative of c∗ with respect to δ delivers:
∂c∗
∂δ
=
α
σ
(−η(1− tX) + 1− tH) .
This implies ∂c
∗
∂δ
> 0⇔ η < 1−tH
1−tX and the reverse. q.e.d.
Lemma 2 Taking the derivative of c∗ with respect to η delivers:
∂c∗
∂η
= −δα
σ
(1− tX).
This implies that ∀tX < 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1) : ∂c∗∂η < 0. Taking the derivative of this expression
with respect to δ delivers:
∂2c∗
∂η∂δ
= −α
σ
(1− tX).
This implies that ∀tX < 1 : ∂2c∗∂η∂δ < 0. q.e.d.
B Best response of large country
U = U¯ + (1− tH)ΠH + (1− tX)ΠX +BH +BX + βtHΠH − C. (23)
This can be simplified to:
U = U¯ +
α
σ
+ (β − 1)tH (1− c∗) (1− δ)α
σ
− tXc∗(1− ηδ)α
σ
− 1
2
(c∗)2. (24)
∂U
∂tH
= (β − 1) (1− c∗) (1− δ)α
σ
− (β − 1)tH(1− δ)α
σ
∂c∗
∂tH
− tX(1− ηδ)α
σ
∂c∗
∂tH
− c∗ ∂c
∗
∂tH
.(25)
∂c∗
∂tH
=
α
σ
(1− δ). (26)
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Setting equal to zero implies:
(β − 1)(1− c∗)(1− δ)α
σ
=
∂c∗
∂t∗H
[
(β − 1)t∗H(1− δ)
α
σ
+ tX(1− ηδ)α
σ
+ c∗
]
. (27)
The term in the last parenthesis can be simplified to:
α
σ
[βt∗H(1− δ) + δ(1− η)] . (28)
Plugging back in and rewriting delivers:
t∗H =
(β − 1)σ/α− βδ(1− η)
(1− δ)(2β − 1) +
(1− ηδ)(β − 1)
(1− δ)(2β − 1) tX . (29)
q.e.d.
C Derivation of kinks of large country best response
function
First kink at ρ˜ = 0 Best response large country (interior solution ρ˜ > 0):
tH(tX)
ρ˜>0 =
(β − 1)σ/α− βδ(1− η)
(1− δ)(2β − 1) +
(1− ηδ)(β − 1)
(1− δ)(2β − 1) tX . (30)
Best response large country (corner solution ρ˜ = 0):
tρ˜=0H (tX) =
1− ηδ
1− δ tX −
δ(1− η)
1− δ . (31)
Note that it is never optimal for the large country to set tH such that ρ˜ < 0, as ρ˜ = 0
already implies zero outflows, i.e. c∗ = 0, but implies higher tax income. Now, the second
order condition of the large country maximization problem is:
∂2U
∂2tH
= − ∂
2c∗
∂2tH
[
(β − 1)tH(1− δ)α
σ
+ tX(1− ηδ)α
σ
+ c∗
]
− ∂c
∗
∂tH
[
(β − 1)(1− δ)α
σ
+
∂c∗
∂tH
]
< 0.(32)
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This implies that the welfare function is strictly concave whenever c∗ > 0. Thus, there
are two cases: if for a given tX equation (30) implies ρ˜ ≥ 0, then the first order condition
(condition (25)) can be solved for the best response function as given by equation (30). If
condition (30) implies ρ˜ < 0, then the constraint ρ˜ = 0 is binding and the best response
function is given by equation (31).
To find the value of tX where the best response function of the large country changes, we
solve for the intercept of functions (30) and (31) which delivers:
tk1X =
(β − 1) [σ/α− δ(1− η)]
β(1− ηδ) . (33)
Second kink at tH = 0 To find the second kink solve equation (30) for tH = 0, which
delivers:
tk2X =
βδ(1− η)− (β − 1)σ/α
(β − 1)(1− ηδ) . (34)
For any value of tX ≤ tk2X the best response function of the large country is tH = 0.
Now check when the equilibrium falls into the area where tH > 0. This is the case if the
best response function of the tax haven at tH = 0 is to the right of t
k2
X . We first derive
tX(tH = 0):
tX(tH = 0) =
δ(1− η)
2(1− ηδ) . (35)
As discussed above, the equilibrium t∗H is larger zero iff tX(tH = 0) > t
k2
X . This implies
t∗H > 0⇔
α
σ
<
2(β − 1)
(β + 1)δ(1− η) . (36)
The equilibrium tax rate of the large country is positive if the profits of a representative
firm α
σ
are not too large. Note that under revenue maximization (β → ∞) the level of
profits does not matter and this condition is always fulfilled. Then, it becomes:
t∗H > 0⇔
α
σ
<
2
δ(1− η) , (37)
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which is always true as α ≤ 1, σ > 1, δ ≤ 1 and η ≥ 0.
Figure 6: This graph illustrates the two kinks in the large country best response function. The
solid line is the best response function of the large country. The left vertical line corresponds to
tk2X and the right vertical line corresponds to t
k1
X .
Best response function large country There are two cases:
First, if tk1X ≤ 1 then the best response function of the large country is given by:
tH(tX) =

(β−1)σ/α−βδ(1−η)
(1−δ)(2β−1) +
β−1
2β−1
1−ηδ
1−δ tX if t
k2
X < tX < t
k1
X
− δ(1−η)
1−δ +
1−ηδ
1−δ tX if tX ≥ tk1X
0 if tX ≤ tk2X ,
with tk1X =
(β−1)[σ/α−δ(1−η)]
β(1−ηδ) and t
k2
X =
βδ(1−η)−(β−1)σ/α
(β−1)(1−ηδ) .
Second, if tk1X > 1 then the best response function of the large country is given by:
tH(tX) =
min
{
(β−1)σ/α−βδ(1−η)
(1−δ)(2β−1) +
β−1
2β−1
1−ηδ
1−δ tX , 1
}
if tk2X < tX ≤ 1
0 if tX ≤ tk2X .
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D Proof of Proposition 1: Equilibrium
First, note that the tax haven needs to attract positive inflows of tax base to generate a
positive welfare level V > 0. It attracts tax base whenever ρ˜ > 0, which is the case when:
tX <
δ(1− η)
1− ηδ +
1− δ
1− ηδ tH . (38)
As long as δ > 0, for any tH > 0 there is some tax rate tX that fulfills this condition. If
δ > 0 and η < 1, the tax haven can also attract tax base if tH = 0. Therefore, a necessary
condition for an equilibrium is ρ˜ > 0. The equilibrium is determined by the intersection
of equation (30) (tH(tX)
ρ˜>0) with equation (14) (tX(tH)).
As discussed before, there are two cases for the best response function of the large country.
In the following we discuss equilibrium existence for each of them separately.
Case 1, tk1X ≤ 1 First, note that in this case the tax rate of the large country tH in
equation (31) is bounded from above by one as tρ˜=0H (tX = 1) = 1. Given that t
k1
X ≤ 1, the
tax rate of the large country tH in equation (30) is bounded from above by equation (31)
for ∀tX ≥ tk1X . Consequently, tρ˜>0H (tX) ≤ 1. Therefore, the equilibrium is either at tH = 0
if tX(tH = 0) ≤ tk2X or it is at the positive intersection between equations (30) and (14).
The equilibrium is unique as equations (30) and (14) are strictly monotonously increasing
in the other country’s tax rate.
Case 2, tk1X > 1 Now, (30) is the best response of the large country for ∀tX > tk2X .
Therefore, the equilibrium is either at tH = 0 if tX(tH = 0) ≤ tk2X , at the positive
intersection between equations (30) and (14) if the intersection is below or equal to one,
or at tH = 1 if the two functions (30) and (14) meet at tH = 1. The equilibrium is
unique as (30) and (14) are strictly monotonically increasing in the other country’s tax
rate. q.e.d.
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E Proof of Proposition 2: Impact of δ
From equation (17), the large country equilibrium tax rate for an interior solution, i.e.
t∗H ∈ (0, 1), is given by:
t∗H =
2(β − 1)σ/α− (β + 1)δ(1− η)
(3β − 1)(1− δ) .
Differentiating with respect to δ gives:
∂t∗H
∂δ
=
1
3β − 1
[
1
(1− δ)2
[
2(β − 1)σ
α
− (β + 1)δ(1− η)
]
− 1
1− δ (β + 1)(1− η)
]
. (39)
Solving for η delivers the following condition on the sign of
∂t∗H
∂δ
:
∂t∗H
∂δ
> 0⇐⇒ η > 1− 2β − 1
β + 1
σ
α
. (40)
The sign is therefore ambiguous. When there is perfect detection (η = 1) we have
∂t∗H
∂δ
|η=1 > 0. In the case of no detection (η = 0) the sign remains positive if the profits of
a firm α
σ
are not too large:
∂t∗H
∂δ
|η=0 > 0⇐⇒ 2β − 1
β + 1
>
α
σ
. (41)
From equation (18), the tax haven equilibrium tax rate for an interior solution, i.e. t∗H ∈
(0, 1), is given by:
t∗X =
(β − 1)[σ/α + δ(1− η)]
(3β − 1)(1− ηδ) .
Differentiating with respect to δ delivers:
∂t∗X
∂δ
=
1
3β − 1
[
η
(1− ηδ)2 (β − 1)
(
δ(1− η) + σ
α
)
+
1
1− ηδ (β − 1)(1− η)
]
> 0.
q.e.d.
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F Proof of Proposition 3: Impact of η
The first result follows from differentiating equation (17) with respect to η, which gives:
∂t∗H
∂η
=
(β + 1)δ
(3β − 1)(1− δ) < 0.
For the second result, take the cross-derivative of t∗H with respect to η and δ:
∂2t∗H
∂η∂δ
=
β + 1
(3β − 1)(1− δ)2 .
Differentiating (18) with respect to η delivers:
∂t∗X
∂η
= − δ(β − 1)
(3β − 1)(1− ηδ) −
(β − 1)δ(3β − 1) [σ
α
+ δ(1− η)]
[(3β − 1)(1− ηδ)]2 .
Which implies:
sign
(
∂t∗X
∂η
)
= sign
(σ
α
+ δ − 1
)
.
Therefore:
σ
α
+ δ − 1 > 0⇒ ∂t
∗
X
∂η
> 0.
q.e.d.
G Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5: Own-tax elasticity
of revenue
Partial differentiation delivers:
∂|BEH |
∂(1− η) = −
δ(1− δ)tH(1− tX)
(σ
α
− ρ˜)2 > 0 (42)
∂|BEX |
∂(1− η) =
δ(1− δ)tX(1− tH)
ρ˜2
< 0. (43)
34
as well as
∂|BEH |
∂δ
=
σ
α
− (1− tX)(1− η)(
σ
α
− ρ˜)2 tH < 0 (44)
∂|BEX |
∂δ
=
(1− tH)(1− η)
(ρ˜)2
tX < 0. (45)
q.e.d.
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